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ARTICLE
Corporate Social Responsibility as Global
Public Law: Third Party Rankings as
Regulation by Information*
CHERIE METCALF
1

INTRODUCTION

Transnational firms have increasingly become the focus of
attention as active participants in the process of generating and
implementing law and norms internationally. 1 The world’s
* Assistant Professor, Queen’s University, Faculty of Law. Initial work on
this project was completed during the author’s LL.M. studies at Yale; support
from a Fulbright / OAS Ecology grant is gratefully acknowledged. Conference
travel funding from the Law Foundation of Ontario to present earlier drafts of
the paper is also gratefully acknowledged. Thanks for helpful comments and
suggestions to participants at the Canadian Economics Association Meetings,
Canadian Law & Economics Association Meetings, U of T Law and Economics
Workshop, Queen’s Law and Economics Workshop, Anita Anand, Howard
Bodenhorn, Patrick Coe, Ian Keay, and Roberta Romano. All remaining errors
and omissions are the responsibility of the author.
1. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International
Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational
Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591, 592-93 (2008) (describing the role of
multinational firms in creating a flexible new governance-style set of
substantive obligations tracking “public” goals, reinforced by a hard
international law regime of monitoring and disclosure); see also Naomi Cahn &
Anthony Gambino, Towards a Typology of Corporate Responsibility in Different
Governance Contexts: What to do in the Absence of Responsible Country
Governance, 39 GEO.J.INT’L L. 655 (contextual approach to possible use of
international law to encourage transnational corporations to pursue “public”
goals and values); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark Cohen, Climate Change
Governance: Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2010)
(outlining the role of transnational firms in providing private governance of
“public” problem of global climate change regulation); Natasha A. Affolder, The
Private Life of Environmental Treaties, 103 AM. J. INT’L. L. 510 (2009)
(explaining the role of multinational firms in directly implementing and
observing public international law treaties); RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELFGOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS (Olaf Dilling
et. al. eds., 2008).
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largest companies are increasingly undertaking voluntary
commitments that overlap with goals and standards drawn from
within the realm of traditionally public regulation. 2 Current
activity by transnational corporations commonly features
commitments to labor standards, environmental responsibility,
and governance practices, as prominent elements of firms’
commitments. 3 The geographic reach of the world’s largest
companies, combined with a lack of corresponding international
regulatory authority, raises the question of whether voluntary
self-regulation by firms through corporate social responsibility
can operate as an effective channel for transnational norm
implementation. While some are optimistic about the potential
for firms to voluntarily undertake commitments that will aid in
resolution of global public law problems, 4 others are doubtful that
the corporate social responsibility movement will provide any

2. The majority of the world’s largest companies now report on their
corporate responsibility commitments. See KPMG, KPMG INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008 14 (2008), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docume
nts/International-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf [hereinafter KPMG
2008] (finding that 79% of G250 now produce stand-alone sustainability reports,
which is an increase in reporting relative to previous years); KPMG, KPMG
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2005 9 (2005),
available at www.kpmg.com.au/Portals/0/KPMG %20Survey%202005_3.pdf
[hereinafter KPMG 2005] (finding that 64% of the G250 reported on Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) activity in 2004, compared with 45% in 2002). A
substantial share of these large companies referenced international instruments
connected with public international law and actors; in 2008, 40% of the G250
made explicit reference to the UN Global Compact, 24% referred to the ILO Core
Labor Conventions and 21% the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
See KPMG 2008 at 29.
3. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents 8 (Org. for
Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Working Papers on International Investment,
Working Paper No. 2001/6, 2001) (the governance practices extend to anticorruption and anti-bribery measures targeting the integrity of public
governance as well as the ethical integrity of the firm’s own conduct).
4. See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO GOLD: HOW
SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE,
AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 54-55 (2006) (arguing that environmentally
responsible strategies can also be profitable and lead to competitive advantage
for firms); see also Vandenbergh & Cohen, supra note 1, at 33 (arguing that
private governance via the Carbon Disclosure Project, if extended to firm supply
chains, could be effective in mitigating climate change in the absence of binding
public international law commitments by states).
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meaningful constraint on firm behavior and consequently offers a
poor prospect as a governance channel. 5
There are two major concerns surrounding the viability of
voluntary corporate social responsibility activity by firms as a
global governance mechanism. 6 The primary concern is whether
this activity is economically sustainable for firms. If corporate
social responsibility commitments simply impose costs on firms
without any financial benefits, they are unlikely to act as a longterm vehicle guiding firms to adopt strategies that are in line
with the goals and values of public law. Secondly, a related
concern is whether firms’ commitments can be accurately
assessed in the international marketplace. Even if corporate
social responsibility would be economically feasible for firms,
problems of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse
selection may render commitments meaningless and limit market
incentives for firms to engage on a long-term basis. These
considerations would tend to render voluntary commitments by
firms ineffective as potential mechanisms for global regulation in
relation to the public law mandates of corporate social
responsibility.
Alongside the growth in voluntary corporate social
responsibility activity by firms, both private and public actors
have begun to try and influence corporate actors directly and to

5. See Helen Keller, Corporate Codes of Conduct and their Implementation:
The
Question
of
Legitimacy
53-58
(2006),
available
at
www.yale.edu/macmillan/Heken_Keller_Paper.pdf (describing corporate social
responsibility codes as toothless marketing exercises); see also Laura Dubinsky,
The Fox Guarding the Chicken Coop: Garment Industry Monitoring in Los
Angeles, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITIES AND LABOR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 160, 161, 170 (Gill Seyfang et. al. eds., 2002) (outlining
the ineffectiveness of corporate social responsibility commitments to labor
standards).
6. Another key consideration is the degree of overlap between the voluntary
commitments of firms and the underlying problems that would ordinarily call
for regulation, such as use of common resources. The present study is primarily
concerned with the potential viability of private commitments by firms and the
effectiveness of attempts by third parties to regulate this activity through the
provision of information. If voluntary commitments are either unsustainable or
ineffective, then there is less need for concern about how well they may serve
the functions of public regulation.
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make corporate social responsibility commitments more robust. 7
Public actors, such as the Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations
(UN), have provided templates for corporate social responsibility
that are intended to serve as common substantive reference
points. 8 Private actors have also developed standards and
rankings that often draw on these and other “public law”
reference points to compare firms and communicate relative
The
performance to potential consumers and investors. 9
intervention of private third-party actors engaged in standardsetting and bench-marking raises the question of whether this
form of “regulation through information” can be an effective
alternative to more traditional public means of legal enforcement,
which are lacking in the international realm in relation to many
of the commitments firms undertake. 10
7. See, e.g., Margaret Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The Roles of
Standardization, Certification and Assurance Services in Global Commerce 2021 (Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper 08-16, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128143 (discussing the role of third party standards
and monitoring in making corporate voluntary commitments effective in the
absence of direct regulation, although paper focuses on implications for vertical
integration of businesses in international setting).
8. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf; see also THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (The Global
Compact is a much less detailed collection of principles for sound business
conduct, drawn from key UN instruments).
9. Some prominent examples include the Dow Jones Sustainability Index
(for investments) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (for firms reporting
on corporate social responsibility). The Global Reporting Initiative appears to
be emerging as a dominant standard for corporate social responsibility
reporting. See KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 38 (noting that in 2008 over 77% of
the G250 reporting companies referred to the GRI framework). In 2010, the UN
Global Compact and GRI announced a new collaboration to integrate the
substantive goals of the Compact within the reporting framework of the GRI.
See The Amsterdam Global Conference on Sustainability and Transparency, UN
Global Compact and GRI Announce New Collaboration (May 28, 2010),
http://www.amsterdamgriconference.org/ index.php?id=39&item=37.
10. See e.g., Backer, supra note 1, at 593 (urging development of hard
international law to encourage monitoring and disclosure of firms’
commitments); see also David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as
Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 379 (2005) (discussing the role of information disclosure as a form of
regulation, particularly focusing on the potential of the GRI as a regulatory form
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This paper examines Fortune Magazine’s “Corporate Social
Responsibility” rankings as a case study to provide empirical
evidence in relation to these questions. The Fortune rankings
provide comparative information about the corporate social
responsibility performance of the world’s largest companies. The
paper uses an event study methodology to examine the market
response to the rankings. The results of the event study provide
information about whether the rankings themselves are perceived
as providing information important to the value of the firms.
Assessment of investor responses to the Fortune rankings also
provides evidence about whether corporate social responsibility
performance is viewed as enhancing the profitability of
companies, and whether market pressure will tend to force
“under-performing” 11 firms to improve their performance or
expand their commitments.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review in
more detail the theory of voluntary self-regulation in the form of
undertaking corporate social responsibility commitments. In
particular, I consider the links between voluntary activity by
firms and global public law, and also briefly review the economic
issues at the heart of debates over whether corporate social
responsibility is viable. In Section 3, I discuss previous empirical
work on the profitability of corporate social responsibility, as well
as the effectiveness of information provision as a regulatory
strategy to set the present study in context. Section 4 describes
the Fortune rankings. Section 5 provides a discussion of the
event study methodology applied in the paper. Section 6 presents
the estimation and results, and Section 7 offers conclusions and
suggestions for future research.

of disclosure and arguing that mandatory domestic disclosure laws would
enhance the regulatory effects of such formal, voluntary reporting).
11. The relative performance depends on the extent to which the firms have
internalized the criteria incorporated in Fortune’s ranking scheme. The content
of the scheme is discussed in Section 4 below.
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THE THEORY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY

2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law
One of the features of current corporate social responsibility
activity by large transnational corporations is its focus on
traditional subjects of public law regulation. Contemporary
surveys of corporate social responsibility reporting indicate that
most companies provide “sustainability” reports documenting
their social, environmental and economic performance. 12
A significant component of firms’ corporate social
responsibility activity is linked to respect for individual rights.
For example, broad commitments to human rights, as well as
more specific attention to labor rights, are common features of the
Codes of Conduct firms adopt to outline their voluntary
Firms report on their performance in
commitments. 13
implementing basic “labor rights,” such as equal opportunity and
non-discrimination, as well as prohibitions on forced and child
labor. 14 Firms also frequently commit to providing reasonable
working conditions for their employees, including workplace
safety, and in many cases extending to more fundamental
individual rights of collective bargaining and free association. 15
12. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 9.
13. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3
at 10 (noting that 25% of Codes in their sample explicitly referenced “human
rights”); see also id. (indicating that 60% of the firms sampled included
commitments to labor rights); KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 24 (stating that
firms’ corporate social responsibility reports also include references to human
rights and labor rights, and noting that 51% of firms’ reports contained general
commitments to human rights and that roughly two thirds of firms’ reports
indicated commitment to equal opportunity and diversity as labor rights, while
just under one third reported support for prohibitions on child or forced labor);
KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 29 (Figure 4.5 indicates use of UN Global
Compact (40%), ILO Core Conventions (24%) and UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (21%) in G250 reporting).
14. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 24.
15. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3,
at 10 (indicating that 75% of sample Codes contain commitments to working
conditions); KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 24 (finding that just under one third of
corporate social responsibility reports indicated support for collective bargaining
and free association).
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The protection and promotion of individual rights is a core
function of public law, and in most international agreements is
recognized as a duty on states. The assumption of responsibility
by transnational corporations in relation to individual rights
represents one strand of their engagement as private actors
promoting public law norms through voluntary activity.
Another prominent focus of voluntary activity by firms is in
the realm of environmental stewardship. 16 A diverse array of
objectives constitute firms’ environmental commitments, but a
common focal point is sustainable development goals, which
include environmentally responsible products and production
methods, responsiveness to community concerns, recycling,
conservation, waste management practices, and energy
Environmental self-regulation by firms is
conservation. 17
distinguished by a greater degree of transparency than other
types of voluntary activity. Firms are more likely to describe
environmental corporate social responsibility goals in terms of
measurable targets and to disclose information about progress to
the public. 18 The recent attention transnational firms have paid
to the issue of global warming illustrates this characteristic. In
2005, over 85% of the G250 19 addressed climate change in their
corporate social responsibility reports and 67% measured and
The
reported on their green house gas emissions. 20
16. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 9, showing that prior to 2004 most
corporate social responsibility reports focused exclusively on environmental,
health and safety issues (73% of reports for the G250 had this focus in 2002).
17. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3,
at 12 (noting that the dominant commitment in Codes in the OECD Survey
related to the environment was to comply with national laws).
18. See id. (stating that 29% of Codes of Conduct touching on environmental
concerns contain this commitment).
19. The G250 are the 250 largest industrial corporations in the world, as
measured by revenue. Fortune compiles a list of the 500 largest companies
annually; for lists for sample years 2004-2006, see Fortune 500, 2004 Full List,
FORTUNE, Apr. 5, 2004, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune500_archive/full/2004; Fortune 500, 2005 Full List, FORTUNE, Apr. 18,
2005, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/
full/2005; Fortune 500, 2006 Full List, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2006/full_list/index.html.
20. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 27 (reporting on direct emissions). In
the survey for 2008, 56% of the G250 surveyed were reporting on their carbon
footprint. See KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 56.
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environmental corporate social responsibility activity of
transnational firms overlaps with public law in its concern for
sustainable development, which inherently involves balancing the
private and social costs and benefits of activity with anticipated
environmental consequences. Practical commitments such as
recycling and hazardous waste management address the
externalities
arising
from
firms’
private
activity.
Characteristically, externalities give rise to market failure and
are a focus of public regulatory intervention. 21 The focus on
global warming further illustrates the coincidence of
environmental corporate volunteerism with public law, as global
climate change presents a classic problem of commons
management that is subject to collective action problems at the
international level.
Consideration of one final category of activity helps to
illustrate the overlap between current self-regulation by firms
and public law.
Recently, transnational firms have been
increasingly focused on making commitments to protect the
integrity of public decision-making as part of their corporate
social responsibility activity. For example, issues of bribery and
corruption have assumed an increasingly prominent profile in
firms’ corporate codes, reporting and governance mechanisms. 22
Commitments to disclosure and transparency related to firms’
voluntary commitments, either directly or through the use of
assurance services, are another aspect of firms’ activity in this

21. Direct government regulation is the solution to externality problems in
the Pigouvian tradition, while creation and enforcement of complete property
rights can produce optimal outcomes in a purely Coasian analysis. In either
case, some form of supporting public law intervention is required to establish
the legal framework to address the environmental spillovers from firms’ activity.
22. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3,
at 8 (reporting that about 23% of the firms in their 2001 sample included Code
commitments directed at combating bribery and corruption); see also EXPERTS IN
RESPONSIBLE INV. SOLUTIONS, CORPORATE CODES OF BUSINESS ETHICS: AN
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF BRIBERY AND ETHICAL STANDARDS IN COMPANIES 6
(2005) (identifying the use of whistle-blowing systems, anti-bribery policies,
prohibitions on political donations, and the adoption and monitoring of ethics
policies as corporate social responsibility practices adopted by companies on the
FTSE All World Developed Index targeted at corruption and bribery).
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area. 23 A major function of public law is to provide mechanisms
to insure the integrity of public decision-making in order to
constrain actors within the bounds of their legal authority and
prevent the capture of public decision-making authority by
special interests.
The anti-bribery, corruption control, and
transparency goals, adopted as part of transnational firms’
corporate social responsibility activities, represent self-regulation
efforts directed at achieving these public law goals.
Corporate social responsibility activity by transnational
corporations not only overlaps with the subjects of public law, but
also connects directly with the norms of public international law.
The most obvious examples can be found in corporate social
responsibility codes and reports that explicitly reference
instruments drawn from public international law. A substantial
proportion of the reports of large transnational corporations
directly reference the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, International Labour Organization (ILO) Core Labor
Conventions, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(MNEs), or the UN Global Compact as benchmarks for their
The Universal Declaration and ILO Core
activities. 24
Conventions are foundational sources of norms in the realm of
public international law. The OECD Guidelines and Global
Compact are not instruments of public international law, but
incorporate principles drawn directly from public international
law. For example, the UN Global Compact requires firms to
adopt and support ten principles that are directly linked to UN
supported instruments, including the Universal Declaration, ILO
Core Labor Conventions, Rio Declaration, and UN Convention on
Corruption. 25 Instruments of public international law can also be
23. See Codes of Conduct: Expanded Review of Their Contents, supra note 3,
at 11-12; KPMG 2005, supra note 3, at 30.
24. See KPMG 2008, supra note 2, at 29 (indicating that of the G250
corporate social responsibility reports, 21% referred to the Universal
Declaration, 24% referred to ILO Core Standards, 13% referred to OECD
Guidelines and 40% referred to the Global Compact).
25. See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World
Economic Forum in Davos, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6881 (Jan. 31, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201.sgsm6881.html;
see also Overview of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Nov. 18,
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influential by providing reference points and guiding the
direction of corporate social responsibility activity by firms. An
illustrative example is the influence of the UN Framework
Convention for Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol on firms’
voluntary climate change activity, which has a matching focus on
measuring greenhouse gas emissions, and also targets to
benchmark progress in achieving socially responsible goals.
The influence of norms from the realm of public international
law is not confined to their direct application in firms’ voluntary
activity.
Another important connection arises through the
influence of third party standards that draw on, or connect to,
norms of public international law. An illustrative example is the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The Global Reporting Initiative
is a standardized framework for reporting on corporate social
responsibility activities developed by an NGO-led coalition that
also includes firms, academics, accounting firms, and business
associations, among others. 26 The index is explicitly designed to
complement the UN Global Compact and has a stated goal of
providing a universal standard by which firms can measure their
performance that will reflect the normative goals of the Global
Other third party standards, such as the
Compact. 27
AccountAbility framework for assessing corporate social
responsibility that was adopted in the Fortune magazine ratings,
2010) (on goals and strategy of the Global Compact); The Ten Principles, UNITED
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/
TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) (discussing the ten
principles and indicating their relationship to key UN instruments).
26. See
What
is
GRI?,
GLOBAL
REPORTING
INITIATIVE,
http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2010). For discussion of the development and structure of the GRI, see Allen L.
White, Why We Need Global Standards for Corporate Disclosure, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 177-82 (2006). See also Case, supra note 10 at 397-401.
27. See Alliances, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting
.org/AboutGRI/WhatIsGRI/Alliances/GRIAlliancesPage.htm (last visited Nov. 18
2010) (listing UN Global Compact as a UN instrument that has “synergies” with
the GRI). For further discussion of the connection between the normative goals
of the Global Compact and the reporting mechanism of the GRI, see THE GLOBAL
COMPACT & GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, MAKING THE CONNECTION: THE GRI
GUIDELINES AND THE UNGC COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS (summarizing before
mentioned
connection,
notably
on
page
3)
available
at
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/A72A4645-B6FA-40B5-A1EEA64E6F0CFBB2/0/260607_COP_MTC.PDF.
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draw on norms of public international law as criteria for
constructing their own assessments of the quality of firms’
corporate social responsibility. 28
Voluntary commitments by firms under the broad rubric of
“corporate social responsibility” target subjects that have
traditionally been viewed as the foci of public law. These
commitments by firms are also both directly and indirectly linked
to normative commitments drawn from public international law.
Corporate social responsibility is a potentially important
mechanism for the transmission of public law norms in the global
sphere, particularly as norm setting in the realm of public
international law often has relatively weak implementation or
enforcement mechanisms.
Corporate social responsibility
commitments by transnational firms offer a complementary
means by which the norms of public international law can be
realized and implemented in a global setting.
Effective
commitments may also self-regulate activities of transnational
corporations with important public law dimensions that are
commonly viewed as resistant to control through unilateral
domestic legislation. 29
The potential for corporate social responsibility activity by
transnational firms to achieve this promise depends on whether
these voluntary commitments are effective. The question of
effectiveness relates to both the economic incentives for firms to
engage in meaningful commitments and the issue of whether the
market can provide a suitable mechanism for rewarding and
enforcing the commitments firms make.
2.2 The Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility
Whether or not corporate social responsibility is a profitable
activity for corporations is hotly contested. 30 There are three

28. See infra Section 4 for discussion of Fortune’s Rankings.
29. For example, the issue of labor rights and standards poses difficult
competitive concerns in a global market.
30. See, e.g., ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 55-58 (making a general case
for the potential profitability of adopting “green” business strategy). For the
perspective of Milton Friedman, perhaps the most famous skeptic of corporate
social responsibility as a profitable strategy for firms, see MILTON FRIEDMAN,
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main channels through which corporate social responsibility has
the potential to enhance the profitability of firms.
Corporate social responsibility largely overlaps with the
phenomena of private provision of public goods by individuals,
but intermediated through consumption and investment markets.
The underlying preferences of consumers and investors are
important to understanding whether or not corporate social
responsibility will be profitable. If consumers and investors have
tastes for the corporate social responsibility dimensions of goods
or firms (e.g. as investments), then voluntary commitments can
be a means of product differentiation that allows firms to earn
supra-normal profits. A number of economists have put forward
theories of individual preferences that would produce demand for
such “bundled” public-private goods. Sen has identified a theory
of preferences under which consumer and investor choices in the
market would reflect prior “commitments” or “sympathies”
directed at the provision of “public goods.” 31 Akerlof and Kranton
have developed an economic model of “identity” that would also
support consumer/investor choice favoring corporate social
responsibility aligned products. 32 However, an implication of
their model is that identity driven CSR demand depends on the
strength of private preferences combined with social influences
that are only triggered when corporate social responsibility is an
observable aspect of consumer/investor choice. 33 The identity
model thus reveals an important potential limitation in firms’
ability to capitalize on corporate social responsibility through
product differentiation if that dimension of their products is not
readily apparent. Empirical evidence offers some support for
claims that consumers and investors may make choices that
reflect willingness to pay for corporate social responsibility
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2002) (1962) (arguing that this is
largely a way in which management diverts wealth from shareholders).
31. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 327 (1977); see also
AMARTYA K. SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM (Harvard Univ. Press 2002)
[hereinafter SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM].
32. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 140
Q. J. ECON. 715, 716 (2000).
33. See id. This is an implication in relation to corporate social responsibility
that flows from the structure of Akerlof and Kranton’s model.
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preferences. 34 However, it is not clear that this form of product
differentiation will always be profitable.
Corporate social responsibility may also be profitable if it
offers a means of preempting costly regulations or anticipating
the regulatory environment in which the firm operates in a
manner that minimizes future costs. This view of corporate social
responsibility is reflected in the views of transnational
corporations themselves. For example, John Browne, a former
CEO of BP, a transnational corporate social responsibility
“leader,” described the development of the company’s internal
GHG emissions trading scheme as a way to get “a seat at the
table and influence future rules.” 35 The approach of third parties
also confirms the viewpoint that corporate social responsibility
can be seen as a way to strategically position a company to
Academic
address future regulatory requirements. 36
commentators have identified this strategic, competitive aspect as
a potential economic incentive for firms to engage in corporate
social responsibility as a preemptive response to future
34. See, e.g., KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 18 (stating that 74% of the G250
firms surveyed about corporate social responsibility indicated that “economic
considerations” were behind their activity, and referenced specific factors such
as “access to capital / shareholder value” (39%), “brand or reputation” (27%), and
“market position” (21%)). Consumer surveys have also documented willingness
to pay for consumer products aligned with corporate social responsibility
commitments to labor and to boycott goods violating “fair” labor practices. See
Kimberly Ann Elliott & Richard B. Freeman, White Hats or Don Quixotes?
Human Rights Vigilantes in the Global Economy, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds.,
2005); Orly Lobel, Sustainable Capitalism or Ethical Transnationalism:
Offshore Production and Economic Development, 17 J. ASIAN ECON. 56, 58 (2006);
Michael T. Rock, Public Disclosure of the Sweatshop Practices of American
Multinational Garment/Shoe Makers/Retailers: Impacts on their Stock Prices, 7
COMPETITION & CHANGE 23, 24 (2003). Recent data indicates that approximately
ten percent of U.S. capital market investment is subject to some form of ethical
screen. This puts the value of the “ethical investment” market at some $2.3
trillion dollars. See Telis Demos, Beyond the Bottom Line: Our Second Ranking
of Global 500 Companies, FORTUNE, Oct. 23, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/10/30/8391850/in
dex.htm.
35. See ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 120.
36. The Dow Jones Sustainability index is based on the idea that recognition
of long-term sustainability challenges will enhance shareholder value in the
long run by enhancing the competitive position of firms. See BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF DOCUMENTS 528 (Radu Mares ed., 2004).
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regulation. 37
However, this aspect of corporate social
responsibility may lead to uncertain impacts on profitability.
Much depends on whether firms perceive risks accurately and
whether investors and corporations perceive future risks
similarly. If firms prepare for the “wrong” environment, then
there is a risk that profitability will be hurt by pre-commitment
through corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, if investors
do not share the corporation’s view of its future operating
environment, corporate social responsibility may dilute the value
of the company.
Finally, corporate social responsibility may enhance
profitability through increased employee productivity or reduced
labor costs.
One possible link between corporate social
responsibility and profitability may come from activity that
provides direct benefits to employees. These “gifts” in excess of a
competitive wage may produce a reciprocal benefit for the firm in
the form of enhanced productivity. The overall efficiency of
production can be enhanced despite deviation from a strictly
competitive, cost-minimizing approach to labor compensation. 38
Another approach to corporate social responsibility as a profitable
strategy through its impact on labor costs can arise where the
activity is tied to “moral” preferences held by prospective
employees. 39 The adoption of corporate social responsibility
commitments can serve as a way to screen employees and allow
firms to pay reduced wages or gain loyalty and productivity

37. See ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 118-20.
38. See generally George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as a Partial Gift
Exchange, 97 Q. J. ECON. 543 (1983). For empirical support, see Lobel, supra
note 34 (discussing labor productivity results for Costco and Walmart). See also
Ernst Fehr, George Kirchsteiger & Arno Reidl, Does Fairness Prevent Markets
from Clearing? An Experimental Investigation, 108 Q. J. ECON. 437 (1993)
(describing experimental results confirming that above market compensation
can be efficient).
39. This strand of corporate social responsibility profitability analysis
essentially draws on the “moral” or “social welfare” enhancing preference held
by individuals as manifested through employment markets. See, e.g., SEN,
RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM, supra note 31; Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 32;
Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with
Simple Tests, 117 Q. J. ECON. 817 (2002).
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thereby enhancing profitability. 40 While there are plausible
efficiency arguments on the labor market side for corporate social
responsibility, the economic sustainability of this rationale is
again unclear as a theoretical matter.
Skeptics of corporate social responsibility point to a number
of potential problems. If it represents a move away from a
strictly shareholder value model of management, corporate social
responsibility may make the decisions of managers more complex
and less transparent. This can lead to management following its
own preferences and incurring “wasteful” expenditures that
reduce the value of the firm. 41 Managerial decisions may become
more arbitrary and undermine profitability. 42 Even if there is a
role for “responsible” firms, alignment with corporate social
responsibility preferences as a stakeholder welfare maximization
model may lead to a reduction in the return on equity in these
firms. 43 If corporate social responsibility leads to this result, then
the co-existence of these firms and “ordinary” firms will be

40. For a formal model of labor market screening based on the corporate
social responsibility preferences of employees, see Kjell Arne Brekke & Karine
Nyborg, Attracting Responsible Employees: Green Production as Labor Market
Screening, 30 RESOURSE & ENERGY ECON. 509 (2008); ROBERT H. FRANK, WHAT
PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND (2003) (providing empirical support for a
compensating wage differential of non-profit company employees in the form of
the socially responsible focus of the companies); see also KPMG 2005, supra note
2, at 18 (finding that 47% of G250 firms cited “employee motivation” as a driver
for corporate social responsibility and linking this to a ‘war for talent’); KPMG
2008, supra note 2 at 18 (in 2008 “Employee Motivation” cited as a driver by
52% of G250); ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 4, at 137 (providing anecdotal
evidence that corporate social responsibility is related to the ability to attract
employees with “green” sensibilities).
41. See e.g. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970; see also FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 38 (1991) (support for general view that shareholder primacy model is the
workable and efficient approach to corporate management).
42. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the
Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9 (2001).
43. This result could arise both if corporate social responsibility is costly/not
profitable for the managerial reasons above and if investors are willing to
sacrifice some financial return on their investments for non-financial rewards in
the form of “moral” satisfaction.
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problematic, since firms focusing on corporate social
responsibility may become a takeover target. 44
The profitability and economic sustainability of corporate
social responsibility activity by firms is not clearly established by
theory. However, the potential for corporate social responsibility
to operate as a significant channel for global governance depends
on its economic viability. Whether or not markets perceive
corporate social responsibility as enhancing the value of firms is
an important empirical question. 45
Aside from the issue of whether corporate social
responsibility is profitable in and of itself, it is questionable
whether the global marketplace will provide a suitable forum for
trade in CSR quality differentiated goods and investments. The
classic work of Akerlof established the risk that trade in products
ostensibly differentiated by unobservable quality can lead to
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection that can destroy
the incentives to produce high quality products. 46 In the
corporate social responsibility context, claims that firms’
commitments are empty marketing exercises reflect the view that
firms have incentives to cheat on their promises and deliver little
in the way of meaningful change in their activity. 47 Unless the
commitments of firms can be made credible, there is little
44. See Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 3 (2001).
45. Another important question relates to the scope of viable corporate social
responsibility relative to “true” public law regulation. While effective corporate
social responsibility commitments may overlap to a degree with the objects and
purposes of public law, the fit is unlikely to be perfect. For a more detailed
exploration of the relationship between corporate social responsibility and public
law, see Cherie Metcalf, Corporate Codes of Conduct, International Trade and
the Private Diffusion of Public Law Norms: Limits and Possibilities (2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). The focus of the present inquiry
is limited to the effectiveness of commitments actually adopted by firms as part
of their corporate social responsibility activity.
46. See George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Jason Scott
Johnston, Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market
Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance 71-73 (Univ. of Pa., Inst.
for Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 05-16, 2005) (discussing this problem of
corporate social responsibility as a “credence good” in relation to environmental
commitments by firms).
47. This is not an uncommon view amongst critics of corporate “selfregulation.” See, e.g., Dubinsky, supra note 5, at 161; Keller, supra note 5 at 13.
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incentive to expend any resources engaging in corporate social
responsibility activity, even for firms that may genuinely intend
to adhere to their commitments. The complexity of international
markets and the supply and distribution networks of
transnational corporations make observation and monitoring of
firms’ performance difficult. However, without some means to
enhance the credibility and comparability of firms’ corporate
social responsibility commitments, the potential for CSR to
operate as a channel for global governance will be severely
limited.
One important potential means by which the quality of firms’
corporate social responsibility commitments can be assured is
through third party assessment and rankings. 48 The emergence
of private, common standards as a means of structuring corporate
social responsibility reporting, such as the GRI, is directed at
achieving this goal. The use of privately constructed screens or
ranking mechanisms to compare the corporate social
responsibility profiles of firms is another element of this strategy
to render it potentially effective in the global market. 49 The
Fortune Sustainability rankings are an example of the
application of a private, third party standard to assess firms’
corporate social responsibility activity, combined with widespread
availability of the comparative results. At this point in time, it is
not clear whether efforts to provide independent benchmarking of
firms’ corporate social responsibility activity through rankings
like Fortune’s will address the potential “lemons” problem.
However, the empirical results from this study will help shed
light on whether this mechanism can help render corporate social
responsibility commitments credible and worthwhile for firms to
undertake.
48. Other means of addressing the “lemons” problem associated with
corporate social responsibility include use of disclosure combined with readily
observable corporate social responsibility commitments, use of assurance
services for corporate social responsibility reports, monitoring of activity, and
incorporation of governance mechanisms to facilitate accountability for
corporate social responsibility quality. For discussion of these possibilities, see
Metcalf, supra note 45 (focusing on the use of third party assessment and
rankings).
49. This type of comparative screening and ranking is implicit in privately
generated screens such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and Domini 400.
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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY & THE
MARKET: RELATED RESEARCH

There are three central empirical questions at the heart of
the present inquiry. Is corporate social responsibility activity
profitable for firms? Can third party rankings provide a means of
making commitments credible? Will capital market responses
provide a disciplining force on companies in relation to their
corporate social responsibility commitments that can take the
place of traditional enforcement actions?
The profitability of corporate social responsibility as a
general matter is deeply contested, and empirical investigation
has not eliminated this uncertainty. A number of researchers
have provided relevant empirical studies.
For example,
Becchetti, Giacomo and Pinnacchio examine the long-run
profitability of social responsibility in their study
which
compares firms in the Domini 400 Social Index portfolio against a
matching sample of non-CSR firms. 50 In that study, the authors
find that socially responsible firms have higher sales per
employee accompanied by lower returns on equity, although with
reduced volatility compared with the non-CSR portfolio. 51
Becchetti et al. interpret their results as weakly supporting the
conclusion that corporate social responsibility represents a move
away from the “shareholder primacy” model toward a
“stakeholder welfare” model. 52 This suggests that, in terms of
pure profitability, “responsible” firms may fare worse than their
irresponsible counterparts.
The results match those in another recent study of the
profitability of corporate social responsibility activity by
Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin. 53 In this study, the authors
50. See generally Leonardo Becchetti, Stefania Di Giacomo & Damiano
Pinnacchio, Presentation at the XIII Tor Vergata Financial Conference: The
Impact of Social Responsibility on Productivity and Efficiency of US Listed
Companies (2004),
available
at
http://art.torvergata.it/bitstream/2108/
80/1/210.pdf.
51. Id. at 14 (sales per employee and level of investment returns), 16
(reduced volatility of returns).
52. Id. at 16-17.
53. Compare Becchetti, Di Giacomo & Pinnacchio, supra note 51, with
Stephen Brammer, Chris Brooks & Stephen Pavelin, Corporate Social
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examine the long-run stock returns of UK firms and relate these
returns to firm social performance using data from the EIRIS
investment service screen. The composite social responsibility
score is negatively correlated with stock performance. 54 The
EIRIS data on firms’ social responsibility characteristics is
proprietary, so it is difficult to know exactly how these
measurements relate to broader investor perceptions of social
responsibility. In addition, incomplete data forced Brammer et al.
to consider only a subset of socially responsible behavior, which
may undermine the generality of their conclusions about the
profitability of corporate social responsibility. 55
Becchetti and Ciciretti in a follow-up study to their earlier
work, found that the lower long-run mean returns of socially
responsible investments are compensated for in terms of relative
risk; the risk-adjusted rates of returns to CSR and non-CSR
stocks are not significantly different. 56 This work again uses the
firms included in the Domini 400 Social Index as the socially
responsible investment portfolio and constructs a matching
sample to assess the impact of corporate social responsibility on
returns. 57 As both the Becchetti et al. study and Becchetti and
Ciciretti’s work focus on the use of the Domini 400 Social index,
the results may be specific to the vision of social responsibility
inherent in that index. An additional potential difficulty lies with
the construction of the matching sample. Particularly given the
long-run comparison, there is a risk that the impact of social
responsibility may be confounded with other effects that are not
captured in the criteria used to match the firms.

Performance and Stock Returns: UK Evidence from Disaggregate Measures
(June 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
54. See Becchetti, Di Giacomo & Pinnacchio, supra note 51, at 11-13
(discussing results).
55. See Brammer, Brooks & Pavelin, supra note 53, at 7 (using measures for
community performance, environmental performance
and employee
performance from the EIRIS service).
56. See generally Leonardo Becchetti & Rocco Ciciretti, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Stock Market Performance 14 (Ctr. for Econ. and Int’l
Studies, Working Paper No. 79, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=897499.
57. See id. at 5.
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In an earlier study, Posnikoff investigated the profitability of
South African apartheid-related divestment as a socially
responsible investment decision by firms. 58 Posnikoff used an
event study methodology to assess the market response to
announcements of divestment by individual companies. Contrary
to her expectations, she found that divestment produced
statistically significant positive excess returns. 59 She attributed
this response to investor tastes for ethical investment, or as a
reflection of consumer preferences embodied in boycotts of
companies with South African connections. 60 In subsequent
follow-up studies, this conclusion was questioned by Meznar,
Nigh, and Kwok, who concluded from their estimates that
whether firms earned positive abnormal returns upon
announcing divestment depended on the timing. 61 Early movers
were not rewarded and instead experienced negative abnormal
returns. Later on, however, and particularly once the U.S.
imposed economic sanctions, divestment announcements did
generate positive returns. 62
The work on South African
divestment suggests that there may be a case for profitable
“ethical” strategies, but it appears highly contingent. It is also
unclear how readily one can generalize from the particular
context of apartheid.
The prior research provides somewhat mixed evidence on the
question of whether corporate social responsibility is a profitable
activity for firms. The present study will complement prior work
by broadening the focus on social responsibility to consider an
additional social responsibility ranking method beyond the EIRIS
and Domini investment screens. In addition, the use of an event
study analysis, made possible by the announcement of annual
rankings in Fortune, will allow for a more targeted focus on the
market response to social responsibility.
However, unlike
58. See Judith F. Posnikoff, Divestment from South Africa: They Did Well by
Doing Good, 15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 76 (1997).
59. Id. at 79,82 (finding positive excess returns under alternative estimation
strategies).
60. See id.
61. See Martin B. Meznar, Douglas Nigh & Chuck C.Y. Kwok,
Announcements of Withdrawal from South Africa Revisited: Making Sense of
Contradictory Event Study Findings, 41 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 715, 729 (1998).
62. See id. (providing this explanation of their results).
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Posnikoff’s divestment example, the Fortune rankings address
corporate social responsibility more comprehensively and in
relation to “ordinary” business practice. The Fortune rankings
apply to the companies in the G100, so there is a cross-sectional
comparison of corporate social responsibility performance
inherent in the rankings that avoids the difficulty of constructing
a matched sample.
A number of recent papers address the question of whether
third party rankings are viewed by the market as providing
independent information. 63 In one such study, Del Guercio and
Tkac use an event study methodology to assess the impact of the
“Morningstar” mutual fund rankings on fund flows. 64 The
authors conclude that changes in the star ranking produce a
statistically significant effect that can be separated from changes
in the underlying performance measures. 65 Del Guerco and
Tkacs’ results also indicate that investors punish firms suffering
a downgrade by imposing negative excess returns in reaction to
the rating announcement. In another study, Cheng, Collins and
Huang also use an event study methodology to address the
impact of the transparency and disclosure rankings by Standard
and Poor. 66 These authors’ results also provide support for the
claim that third party rankings can be viewed as providing new
information to the market. Cheng et al. find that investors
responded to the Standard and Poor rankings when the rankings
revealed discrepancies with disclosure in annual reports, bidding

63. It is implicit in both Becchetti, Di Giacomo & Pinnacchio, supra note 51
and Becchetti & Cicciretti, supra note 56 that inclusion in the Domini 400 will
convey meaningful information about a firm’s social responsibility profile.
64. See Diane Del Guercio & Paula A. Tkac, Star Power: The Effect of
Morningstar Ratings on Mutual Fund Flow (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
Working Paper No. 2001-15, 2001).
65. Funds are rated on a simple five-star scale. The results are available
freely on the internet. See id at 29-30.
66. See C.S. Agnes Cheng, Denton Collins & Henry Huang, Investors’
Interpretation of the October 15, 2002 Standard & Poor Transparency &
Disclosure Rankings 14 (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (the study examines the effect of the ranking of transparency and
disclosure practices of firms, compiled by the investment firm Standard and
Poor); see also Sandeep A. Patel and George S. Dallas, Transparency and
Disclosure: Overview of Methodology and Study Results,(Oct. 16, 2002).
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down share values. 67 Linciano uses an event study methodology
to address the impact of rating actions by the investment services
of Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor on a sample of Italian
firms. 68 She finds that rating downgrades and credit watches
produce significant negative effects on stock prices, a result that
mirrors recent findings by other researchers targeting U.S.
stocks. 69
A small group of papers have focused on evaluating the
significance of rankings in Fortune magazine itself. Filbeck and
Preece use both an event study methodology and a long-run
approach to assess the information provided by Fortune’s Best 100
Companies to Work for in America annual survey over the period
from 1987-1999. 70 The authors find that inclusion in the ranking
generates a significant positive abnormal return over the
announcement period and higher long-run performance in
comparison with a matched sample of non-award winning
Fortune’s rankings of America’s Most Admired
firms. 71
Companies have also been the subject of study by academic
researchers. For instance, Antunovich and Laster examine the
long-run returns over the sample period from 1983-1996, sorting
the firms by decile. The authors find that the most admired firms
earn positive abnormal returns, while those in the bottom decile
experience negative excess returns. 72 In another study, Chung et
al. assess these Fortune rankings over the period from 1990-1998,
considering only the top 10 and bottom 10 firms in the ranking,
adjusting the returns for risk. They find little evidence that the

67. See Cheng, Collins & Huang, supra note 66, at 14.
68. See generally Nadia Linciano, The Reaction of Stock Prices to Rating
Changes 1 (July 31, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
69. See id. at 2-3. But see Maria Vassalou & Yuhang Xing, Equity Returns
Following Changes in Default Risk: New Insights into the Informational Content
of Credit Ratings (EFA 2003 Annual Conference, Paper No. 326, 2003)
(suggesting that the independent informational content of ratings changes is
poor, since fundamentals can predict changes in the stock prices as well).
70. See generally Greg Filbeck & Dianna Preece, Fortune’s Best 100
Companies to Work for in America: Do They Work for Shareholders?, 30 J. BUS.
FIN. & ACCT. 771, 777-79 (2003).
71. See id at 784.
72. Peter Antunovich & David Laster, Do Investors Mistake a Good Company
for a Good Investment? 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 60, 1998).
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Fortune rankings produce any significant effect. 73
Finally,
Filbeck, Gorman and Preece also address the Most Admired
Companies rankings, calculating and comparing annual returns
for the top 50-ranked firms, bottom 50-ranked firms and the
market. These authors find that the most admired firms
outperformed the market by a statistically significant margin
over the period from 1982-1994. 74
While prior research clearly establishes the potential for
independent rankings to convey information to the market, this
research has not directly targeted the rankings applicable to
corporate social responsibility investments. The independent
content of third party corporate social responsibility rankings is
an empirical question of critical importance to the debate over
whether it can be made effective as a global governance
mechanism. Prior research indicates potential for rankings
associated with Fortune to convey independent information to the
market; this study will build on this prior work in the context of
corporate social responsibility rankings. While the results from
prior Fortune surveys could be interpreted as targeting specific
aspects of corporate social responsibility in a domestic context,
the present inquiry focuses on a much broader definition of
corporate social responsibility, and is more international in scope.
The question of whether capital markets can operate to
enforce “regulation by information” has been addressed in
numerous studies. One strand of research closely related to the
environmental
stewardship
prong
of
corporate
social
responsibility examines whether capital markets respond to
information about environmentally harmful behavior by firms.
The evidence is mixed. In one study, Hamilton examined the
initial release of information under the Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI) in the U.S., using an event study methodology, and found a
statistically significant negative abnormal return for reporting

73. This manuscript is discussed in Brammer, Brooks & Pavelin, supra note
53, at 4.
74. Greg Filbeck, Raymond Gormon & Dianna Preece, Fortune’s Most
Admired Firms: An Investor’s Perspective, 18 STUDIES ECON. & FIN. 74, 79-80
(1997).
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firms. 75 In another study, Konar and Cohen found that firms
suffering the largest losses through stock effects generated by the
TRI subsequently reduced their emissions more than other
firms. 76 However, a study of a Canadian equivalent to the TRI by
Lanoie, Laplante and Roy found generally insignificant effects on
firm value generated by capital market responses. 77 These
studies are focused on the impact of information released in
conjunction with regulatory programs, so their implications for
the more “market-driven” type of information represented by
third party corporate social responsibility rankings is unclear.
In a study of the stock market response to environmental
news in developing countries, Dasgupta, Laplante and Maningi
find significant effects in response to both favorable news (e.g.,
awards) and negative events (e.g., citizen complaints and
governmental enforcement actions). 78 This study provides some
support for the claim that, at least in relation to environmental
claims, information that is not generated through regulatory
channels can have disciplinary effects through stock price
incentives. Gupta and Goldar provide evidence of the most direct
relevance to the present study. 79 The authors conducted an event
study to determine the impact of environmental performance
rankings of firms in India’s pulp and paper, auto and chlor-alkali
manufacturing industries. The rankings, composed by a UNEPassisted Indian NGO, compared each firm to an ideal “best
practice,” ranked the firms and provided scores of one (worst)

75. See generally James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock
Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 98 (1995).
76. See generally Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as
Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions,
32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997).
77. See Paul Lanoie, Benoit Laplante & Maite Roy, Can Capital Markets
Create Incentives for Pollution Control?, 26 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 31, 38 (1998) (but
also finding significant abnormal returns for cases where firms were repeatedly
placed on the list of firms out of compliance or of concern).
78. See Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante & Nlandu Mamingi, Pollution
and Capital Markets in Developing Countries, 42 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 310,
312 (2001).
79. See Shreekant Gupta & Bishwanath Goldar, Do Stock Markets Penalize
Environment-Unfriendly Behaviour? Evidence from India, 52 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
81 (2005).
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through five (best) “leaves.” 80 While the authors’ results are
somewhat mixed, they do find a statistically significant negative
effect for pulp and paper firms, which all rated poorly relative to
the ideal benchmark, and a stronger negative effect for the worst
performers. 81 The study provides some evidence that third party
rankings can provide information significant enough to markets
to generate disciplinary incentive effects through stock price
responses.
Evidence on the potential for “market discipline” outside of
the environmental side of corporate social responsibility is less
well developed. In one study, Epstein and Schnietz use an event
study approach to examine the stock effects for industries
identified as “abusive” during the 1999 Seattle World Trade
Organization (WTO) protests. 82 The authors find that firms
among the Fortune 500, in sectors characterized as having
“abusive” environmental or labor practices, suffered significant
negative excess returns in relation to the protests. 83 However,
disaggregating the categories led to only environmental concerns
triggering significant responses. 84 In another study, Rock uses
an event study analysis to examine responses to news stories
about the use of sweatshop labor by U.S. multinationals. 85 He
finds significant negative abnormal returns generated by the “bad
news” sweatshop stories. 86 Both the studies above provide
evidence that capital markets may create incentive effects that
can provide an alternative to regulatory enforcement in relation
to the corporate social responsibility commitments of
transnational corporations. However, the focus of the studies is
quite narrow.
The present study will provide additional
information about how capital markets react to a more systematic
evaluation of corporate social responsibility performance,

80. Id. at 82-85 (for description of the environmental performance rankings).
81. Id. at 91.
82. See Marc J. Epstein & Karen E. Schnietz, Measuring the Cost of
Environmental and Labor Protests to Globalization: An Event Study of the
Failed 1999 Seattle WTO Talks, 16 INT’L TRADE J. 129, 129-30 (2002).
83. Id. at 152-53.
84. Id. at 153-55.
85. See generally Rock, supra note 34.
86. See id. at 29.
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revealed through third party rankings, rather than news stories
or specific protests.
4

FORTUNE’S SUSTAINABILITY RANKINGS

The entry of Fortune Magazine into the business of corporate
social responsibility ranking is an illustration of how central it
has become to the world’s largest companies. Fortune is a leading
popular business publication and is regarded as having the
potential to influence investors through its business rankings. 87
Fortune has produced annual rankings of corporate social
responsibility performance since 2005.
The results of the
rankings are published widely. In addition to news releases and
early availability of the results on the magazine’s website, the
results are published in hard-copy editions of the magazine with
additional articles and commentary. 88 The rankings are directed
at assessing the performance of the world’s largest enterprises.
The ranking methodology changed substantially in 2007, as it
introduced a new component to measure the operational success
of the ranked firms’ sustainability commitments. 89 With this
break in methodology, combined with the extreme turbulence in
markets in recent years, I have restricted the current study to the
initial releases of the rankings in 2005 and 2006. 90

87. See, e.g., Filbeck & Preece, supra note 70 at 790 (relative influence of
Fortune and its rankings).
88. The 2005 rankings were published in the October 3, 2005 international
edition of Fortune, see Simon Zadek, Responsibility Isn’t a Blame Game,
FORTUNE INTERNATIONAL (ASIA), Oct. 3, 2005. The 2006 rankings were published
in the October 30, 2006 issue, see Simon Zadek, Separating Smart from Great,
FORTUNE, Oct. 30, 2006. Fortune has continued to publish its Sustainability
Rankings each year, with results available in its November issue, as well as
being available online. See, e.g., Most Accountable Companies for 2008,
FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
global500/2008/accountability/index.html.
89. See ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY RATING 2007 6
(2007) available at http://www.accountabilityrating.com/past_results.asp.
90. I investigated whether it would be possible to extend the sample to
include the later rankings, in order to see if the addition of the new component
enhanced the market impact of the rankings. However, by 2007 the events
associated with the global financial crisis were beginning to have a significant
impact on the sample firms, eliminating all but 25 firms when considering
potential confounding news. I felt that use of the event study methodology in
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Even with this restricted sample, the selection criteria have
changed somewhat. The 2005 rankings were calculated for the
full sample of firms within the Fortune Global 100. 91 The 2006
rankings were calculated for a sample that included the Global
50, plus the ten largest companies in five sectors: automotive;
computer, electronics and telecommunications; financials;
petroleum refining; and utility/energy. In addition, the 2006
sample included the top ten firms from the 2005 rankings. 92 The
2006 results, which Fortune referred to as the G50+ results,
extend to 64 companies. The Fortune rankings build on and
essentially continue corporate social responsibility rankings
produced by the consultancies AccountAbility and csrnetwork. 93
The 2004 rankings produced by AccountAbility were initially
published without the tie to Fortune. 94 The 2004 rankings
targeted the Fortune Global 100, and they have been treated as
methodologically comparable to Fortune’s rankings; they were

these unusual circumstances would be unlikely to reliably separate out the
relatively small impact from the rankings.
91. The “Global 100” are Fortune’s estimated largest 100 companies in the
world measured by annual revenue.
92. See generally ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY RATING
2006:
BENCHMARKING
METHODOLOGY
(2006),
available
at
http://english.cbcsd.org.cn/dynamic/bringup/download/ar2006.pdf
[hereinafter
METHODOLOGY]. The inclusion of the top ten from 2005 is noted only in the
summary of the results. See ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY
RATING 2006: SUMMARY REPORT OF RESULTS 3 (2006), available at
http://www.accountabilityrating.com/past_results.asp. Since the 2005 top ten
were strong performers, the requirement to include them in 2006 was largely
redundant, which likely explains its absence from the documentation of
methodology.
93. AccountAbility is a self-described “leading international organization”
with a mission to “promote sustainable development” through the development
of accountability tools and standards, including the AA1000 series in particular.
http://www.accountability.org/aboutSee
About
Us,
ACCOUNTABILITY,
us/index.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010). The OECD Expanded Review
indicates that a small proportion of companies adhere to the AA1000 standard
explicitly. Csrnetwork is a “leading” U.K. corporate social responsibility
consultancy firm. See About Us, CSRNETWORK, http://www.csrnetwork.com/
aboutus.asp (last visited Sept.11, 2010).
94. See ACCOUNTABILITY & CSRNETWORK, ACCOUNTABILITY RATING 2004 16
(2004) available at http://www.accountabilityrating.com/past_results.asp.
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published alongside the 2005 rankings in Fortune’s first annual
corporate social responsibility review. 95
The rankings for 2004-2006 are established by application of
the corporate social responsibility assessment tool developed by
AccountAbility, in conjunction with csrnetwork. This standard
incorporates aspects of the UN Global Compact, as well as the
GRI, in constructing the standard. 96 In order to rate a company,
evaluation is carried out across six “domains”: stakeholder
engagement (individuals with ability to influence or be affected
by business of the company); governance (consideration of
stakeholder issues by senior executives, governance structures
related to transparency and accountability); strategy (seek to
achieve social and environmental targets alongside financial,
embedded non-financial strategy); performance management
(processes, standards and incentives target social and
environmental goals); assurance (independent assurance of social
and environmental management and reporting); and public
disclosure (report thoroughly on social and environmental
performance). 97 For each of the domains, a score is established
by considering the information available in each company’s
published annual and sustainability reports. 98 The stakeholder
engagement and strategy domains are considered most
important. 99 A company can earn a maximum possible score of
95. AccountAbility identifies the rankings for 2004-2006 as a comparable,
consistent set of measures, although acknowledging some minor changes in the
methodology. See METHODOLOGY, supra note 92, at 3 (comparability, use of 20042006 rankings to identify trends over time), 5 (acknowledging changes in
methodology). For the purposes of the present study, it is the perceptions of the
market to the rankings that is being assessed, so the presentation of the results
as comparable to the published rankings is key.
96. See id. at 2. It should be noted, however, that the precise way in which
these initiatives are reflected in calculating the scores is not publicized.
97. See id. at 2-3.
98. The reports of the global operations were primary data for the Global
rankings, although information on subsidiary companies that impact global
operations were also considered. Only reports published in English were
assessed. Only data contained in the published reports was considered, with the
exception of data on company websites that was explicitly referenced in the
published report. See METHODOLOGY, supra note 92, at 3.
99. The stakeholder engagement and strategy domains have maximum
scores of 20 each, and the other domains have maximum scores of 15. See
METHODOLOGY, supra note 92, at 2.
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100. The Fortune rankings publish the scores each company
earns, as well as ranking the companies. 100 Although the
rankings are targeting corporate social responsibility, the
approach stresses the business, rather than simply appealing to
morals. The rankings are intended to reflect corporate social
responsibility as a profitable business strategy. 101
The Fortune rankings provide a good case study to assess the
potential for third party standards and rankings to support
corporate social responsibility activity as a form of global public
law. The standard itself draws on instruments from the realm of
international public law to weigh and rank the performance of
large transnational corporations. In addition, the application of
this standard to information already in the public domain allows
for a clean test of whether the standard and ranking per se is
seen to convey new information by the market. The focus on
corporate social responsibility as a smart business strategy allows
a test of whether markets agree with the case for profitability
embedded in the standard. The rankings present a crosssectional assessment of large companies that are focused on
corporate social responsibility and which span a range of
performance. The annual rankings allow for assessment at a
point in time, which can minimize confounding influences.
However, the series of rankings introduces the dynamic element
of relative performance over time. This creates an additional
opportunity to test whether markets may “punish” companies
that slip in their performance, or reward “good” performers. One
potential limitation is that the rankings focus on the way in
which corporate social responsibility is integrated into the
100. This is also the publication format for the 2004 rankings. It is not
completely clear how the ranks are established, as a number of companies had
identical scores. The GRI, which the Accountability methodology references,
incorporates some qualitative criteria that may be reflected in the ultimate
rankings. Alternatively, identical composite scores that are more heavily
weighted toward the critical stakeholder engagement and strategy categories
may rank higher. For the purposes of this study, I will assume that the ranks
can be treated as reflecting additional information.
101. See Demos, supra note 34 at 1 (reporting on corporate social
responsibility performance, expressing opinion that investment screened for
corporate social responsibility reflects the view that “socially responsible
companies will outperform companies that don’t engage a wide array of
stakeholders… in an ongoing conversation about what can be done better.”).
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business of the companies, rather than comparing the direct
results of companies’ activity. 102 Like other standards, the
Fortune rankings reflect a particular version of corporate social
responsibility and it is the market response to this specification
that will be revealed through empirical analysis.
5

EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY

The announcement of unexpected information relevant to
corporate performance provides the paradigmatic opportunity to
use what is known as an “event study” analysis. Application of
event study methodology is based on the assumption that stock
markets rapidly process and absorb information (the efficient
markets hypothesis), combined with the assumption that in
equilibrium the value of a stock reflects the present discounted
value of the investment. 103 These twin assumptions allow the
impact of an event that reveals new information about a company
to be determined by looking to the response in the stock price
immediately following the announcement of the event. According
to the efficient markets hypothesis, the financial implications for
the company will be rapidly processed by investors and
manifested in adjustments to the company’s stock price. 104 Event
study analysis has been applied in a large number of published

102. This aspect of the standard is illustrated by the fact that BP scores
highly, as corporate social responsibility concerns are deeply embedded into
their strategy and operations. As a major oil company, their contribution to
GHG, for example, would be enormous. If practical effects of operations were
the metric, BP would be unlikely to top the rankings. The approach under the
standard seems justifiable, since otherwise attention to corporate social
responsibility would be practically impossible for many industries. One cannot
simply eliminate certain industries from promoting social responsibility, so it
seems likely that a more nuanced approach will reflect the dimensions of
corporate social responsibility that consumers and investors are likely to care
about.
103. For the seminal paper developing the event study methodology drawing
on these assumptions, see Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen
& Richard Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L
ECON. REV. 1 (1969) (investigating the empirical impact of stock splits). See also
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991) [hereinafter
Efficient Capital Markets].
104. See Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 103, at 1602.
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papers. 105 Event studies have been particularly useful tools
within the realm of corporate law, given the close connection
between the focus on securities prices in event studies and the
shareholder primacy model of corporate law. 106
The structure of an event study is quite straightforward. 107
The first step is the identification of the unanticipated event of
interest. The announcement date must be identified; if the time
at which the information becomes available cannot be pinned
down fairly precisely, the event study methodology cannot be
used. 108 The usual practice is to specify an “event window”
during which to assess the impact of the information on the stock
price. This is because both the exact time at which investors will
have access to information is imprecise, and because markets
may not react instantly and completely to information (semistrong efficient markets). The window is usually specified as
narrowly as possible, since the power of statistical results will
diminish, conditional on sample size, as the window is
expanded. 109

105. For a review of some papers dealing with the efficient markets
hypothesis, see id. at 1599-1602. For a general review, see A. Craig MacKinlay,
Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13 (1997).
106. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the
Law: Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141
(2002) [hereinafter Event Studies and the Law: Part I]; Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate
Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380 (2002) (discussing the event study methodology
and reviewing literature applying the method to assess the wealth effects of
corporate litigation and the impact of corporate law more generally).
107. For descriptions of the event study methodology, see generally MacKinlay,
supra note 105; Event Studies and the Law: Part I, supra note 106 (tailoring to a
legal audience); John Binder, The Event Study Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV.
OF QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 111 (1998); Stephen Brown & Jerold Warner,
Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3
(1985) [hereinafter Using Daily Stock Returns] (tailoring to a technical
audience); Gupta & Goldar, supra note 79; Rock, supra note 34 (explaining
applications of the methodology).
108. But note that event study methodology has been used to study the impact
of regulatory changes, which can involve less precision in identifying the event
time. For a discussion of the application of the methodology under these
conditions, see generally Douglas J. Lamdin, Implementing and Interpreting
Event Studies of Regulatory Changes, 53 J. ECON. & BUS. 171 (2001).
109. For quantifications of the impact on power of the length of the event
window for various sample sizes, see MacKinlay, supra note 105, at 29-34. For a
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The impact of the event for an individual firm is assessed by
comparing the actual return on the firm’s security over the event
window with the expected return. More formally, one calculates
the abnormal return for firm i in time period t:

ARit = Rit − E (Rit | Xit )
where X it is the conditioning information used to determine
the expected return on the firm’s security. The most common
approach to estimating the expected return is to employ the
“market return” model. The market return model assumes that
the expected return on any given security is a stable linear
function of the market return, which can be formally modeled as
follows:

Rit = α i + β i Rmt + eit

where R mt is the market return at time t and where e it is a

Var (e ) = σ 2

it
e i . 110 As is common in many
random disturbance with
studies, I will use the market model to calculate expected
returns. 111

summary of the key results, see Event Studies and the Law: Part I, supra note
106, at 88-92.
110. There are additional models for calculating the expected return, including
the factor loading approach, a more complex version of the market model, which
can offer marginal gains in precision at a cost of imposing additional data
requirements. See MacKinlay, supra note 105, at 18-19. Additional possibilities
include models that impose restrictions from economic theory in the structure of
the estimating equation for expected returns. The main additional alternatives
are the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the arbitrage pricing model.
However, there is little to be gained relative to the market model by using these
approaches, and the assumptions underlying the CAPM model have been called
into question. Id. at 19.
111. Note that some authors have criticized the market model. See, e.g., J.
Andrew Coutts, Terence C. Mills & Jennifer Roberts, The Market Model and The
Event Study Method: A Synthesis of the Econometric Criticisms, 3 INT’L REV. OF
FIN. ANALYSIS 149 (1994) (identifying ways in which the market model fails to
conform to underlying assumptions, including non-normality and dependence in
residuals, as well as instability in the estimated coefficient). These problems
render Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates inefficient and make it difficult
to establish the power of statistical tests based on the estimates, which are
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In order to calculate the abnormal return for firm i during
period t, the market return model is estimated. Ordinary Least
Squares is both a consistent estimation procedure and efficient
Once the
under the maintained assumptions above. 112
parameters of the market return model have been estimated,
they can be used to predict the expected return for the security of
company i at time t. The difference between the predicted and
actual return following the event will yield the “abnormal
return,” AR it , that reveals the impact of the event on the value of
the firm:

ARit = Rit − αˆ i − βˆ i Rmt
The abnormal return is just the forecast error of the market
model, calculated on an out of sample basis. If the sample period
for estimation of the market model itself is long enough, under
the null excess returns will be normally distributed, with
2
2
E ( ARit ) = 0 and σ ARit = σ e i .

In order to assess the significance of the event, abnormal
returns are generally aggregated. For individual firms, abnormal
returns are aggregated over the period of the event window, T 1 to
T 2 to determine cumulative abnormal returns attributable to the
event:

T2

CARi (T1, T2 ) = ∑ ARit
t = T1
The variance of cumulative abnormal returns for firm i over
the event window is as follows:
nevertheless valid asymptotically. But see John Cable & Kevin Holland, Robust
vs. OLS Estimation of the Market Model: Implications for Event Studies, 69
ECON. LETTERS 385, 388 (2000) (finding that normality of the errors is not
generally a problem when returns are averaged over a portfolio of a size common
in event studies (60 companies)).
112. See MacKinlay, supra note 105, at 20.

33

02 METCALFMACROV7

178

1/5/2011 5:46 AM

[Vol. 28

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

σ i2 (T1, T2 ) = (T2 − T1 + 1)σ e2i
The firm-specific hypothesis that cumulative abnormal
returns are zero can be tested with a simple Z-statistic,
distributed normally with the variance defined above. However,
results for a single firm are unlikely to be very meaningful,
especially given the low power of tests for such a small sample.
The general approach is to aggregate cumulative abnormal
returns both over time (the event window) and across a number of
firms that experience a similar event, or across a number of
similar events for the same firm (e.g. across events). Tests are
then conducted using the cumulative average abnormal return:

CAAR(T1, T2 ) =

N

CAR(T , T )
∑
N
1

2

1

i=1

The variance of CAAR will be given as follows:

var(CAAR(T1, T2 )) =

1

N

2

N

∑σ i (T ,T )
2

1

2

i=1

Under the null that the cumulative average abnormal
returns are zero, a z-test can be used to test the statistical
significance of the CAAR for the event window, averaged across
firms/events. 113
113. The distributional results are asymptotic, so a large enough sample of
events and estimation period for the market return model are required to avoid
inaccuracy from imposing the asymptotic distribution. See MacKinlay, supra
note 105, at 24. A further problem with statistical inference for cumulative
average abnormal returns measures can arise from failure of the assumptions of
independent, identical distributions for the abnormal returns of the firms in the
sample. “Clustering” of the events in calendar time and of sample firms within
industry groups can lead to violation of these assumptions by creating crosssectional dependence. See Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Measuring
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ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

6.1 Estimation Data
A number of refinements to the sample of ranked firms
included in Fortune’s analysis were required in order to carry out
the estimation. I obtained daily common stock prices from the
CRSP database for the firms included in the 2004, 2005 and 2006
corporate social responsibility rankings associated with Fortune
magazine and AccountAbility. 114 Only firms trading on the
NYSE or NASDAQ could be included in the sample. This
required dropping some firms since a number of the firms
included in the Fortune rankings are traded on other exchanges,
or are not public companies. 115 In order to have a sufficiently
long period to estimate the market returns model, a period of 200
calendar days prior to the event date was chosen. 116 This

Security Price Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 233 (1980); Using Daily Stock
Returns, supra note 107, at 28; Binder, supra note 107, at 120; MacKinlay,
supra note 105, at 28. However, so long as securities are chosen from a
sufficient number of different industries and the market model is used,
assuming independence is unlikely to be problematic. See Binder, supra note
107, at 116; Using Daily Stock Returns, supra note 107, at 15, 22.
114. CRSP is the Center for Research on Securities Prices database,
associated with the Booth Business School at the University of Chicago. For a
history of this database, see About CRSP, History, CHI. BOOTH, CTR. FOR
RESEARCH IN SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/crsp/about/history.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2010). The data can be accessed through allied third party data
services, for a list, see The CRSP Third Party Alliance Program, CHI. BOOTH,
CTR. FOR RESEARCH IN SEC. PRICES, http://www.crsp.com/crsp/alliances.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2010). The stock prices that I use from the CRSP database were
adjusted for dividends.
115. For example, some state-owned energy companies, such as the Mexican
Pemex, were included in the Fortune rankings. Although the Fortune rankings
do not disclose whether the companies are publicly held, privately held, or state
owned, this information is generally readily available through company sites or
media sources. The CRSP database naturally does not include data on
securities prices for companies that are not publicly traded.
116. This resulted in estimation periods for the market model of 138, 139 and
135 trading days for 2006, 2005 and 2004, respectively. Choosing a sufficiently
long period for estimation of the market model, in comparison with the event
window, reduces bias in hypothesis tests about cumulative average abnormal
returns that can arise from time dependence in the residuals from the market
model and cumulative abnormal returns of firms. See Binder, supra note 107, at
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eliminated a number of additional firms, as prices for the common
stock were not available on a continuous basis throughout the
pre-event period. 117 Finally, some firms were excluded because of
possible confounding news within the event windows for
assessing the impact of the Fortune rankings. 118 The final
sample included 52 firms in 2004, 52 firms in 2005 and 37 firms
in 2006. 119 The firms, although transnational in their operations,
were headquartered in three major regions: Asia, North America
and Europe. The firms represented a diverse array of sectors,
including automotive manufacturing; computers and electronics;
petroleum refining and chemicals; energy and utilities; financial,
trading and merchandise; and consumer products. Summary
data for the sample firms is given in Table 1.

116 (citing Michael Salinger, Standard Errors in Event Studies, 27 J. OF FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 39 (1992).
117. Merger was generally the culprit.
118. If other events that might be expected to influence a company’s stock
price occur at the same time as Fortune’s rankings are released, the impact of
those events will overlap with any effect of the rankings, so that it is not
possible to identify the influence of the rankings. I chose to search media
databases for any stories related to the included companies, eliminating from
the sample any firms with possible confounding news. I searched the Financial
Times database in Westlaw, which includes articles from the Financial Times
U.K. and U.S. editions, as well as online articles from the Financial Times
website. I also performed secondary searches in the The NEWSINT-PRO
database containing full text documents from WestnewsPRO International
News. I excluded companies if articles mentioning the company in the headlines
or lead paragraphs, appeared to reveal or be based on new information. The
confounding events included strike settlement, announcements related to the
initiation and settlement of lawsuits, bond downgrades and earnings
announcements.
119. The timing of the 2006 Fortune Rankings was unfortunate from the
perspective of using an event study analysis, since a number of companies,
including BP, Shell, GM and others, reported their third quarter earnings
during this period.
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Table 1: Summary Data: Sample CSR Ranked Firms
Year
2004
2005
2006
Number of Firms
North America
Europe
Asia

52
25
21
6

52
27
20
5

37
15
15
7

CSR Scores
Average CSR Score
Average CSR Leader’s Score
Average CSR Laggard’s
Minimum Score
Maximum Score

23
39
6
1
67

31
48
11
2
71

33
52
14
4
72

Note: Corporate social responsibility “Leaders” and “Laggards” are
respectively defined as firms within the top third and bottom third
of the sample ranked firms.

In order to implement the analysis, the event date must be
identified and event windows must be specified. The Fortune
rankings are announced through press releases and uploaded to
the Internet prior to hard-copy publication in the magazine. I
have assumed that the appropriate event date is the initial
release of the information through the media and electronic
distribution of the results. These dates were obtained from press
releases and web-based material on the rankings. The 2004
AcountAbility rankings were announced in a press release and
timed for release to coincide with the UN Global Compact
Leaders Summit in New York. 120 For both the Fortune and
AccountAbility rankings, information should have been widely
available to the public on the release date. The initial publication
of information about the ranking and scores of the companies
thus provides a relatively crisp indication of the appropriate
120. See Press Release, AccountAbility, New Global Rating Challenges Top
100
Companies’
Accountability
(June
23,
2004),
available
at
http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/14269-New-Global-Rating-ChallengesTop-100-Companies-Accountability.
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event dates. 121 Nevertheless, it is possible that some information
was available early, 122 and there is uncertainty about the precise
time that the information was available on the event date. 123
The theory does not offer a strong methodological basis for
the selection of the event window, beyond general concerns with
loss of power and an increased possibility of confounding events
as the window is lengthened. The speed at which markets are
presumed to adjust is critical to the appropriate length of the
event window. While some scholars recommend windows limited
to one, or perhaps two days, 124 others have applied event
windows well over a week in length. 125 Recent research by
Antweiler and Frank indicates that very short event windows
may not be appropriate, and that results can be very sensitive to
the choice of event window. 126 In this study, I have considered
event windows of various lengths as a robustness check on the
findings. Letting day 0 be the event day and denoting days prior
to the event with a - sign, the event windows I consider are: [0],
[0,2], [0,4], [-1,0], [-1,1], [-1,3]. Roughly, these correspond to
considering one, three and five day alternatives for the event
window, beginning on the event day itself and one day prior to
the event date. 127
A final point to note is that estimation requires the selection
of a measure of market returns. There are several possible
choices; the analysis reported here is based on use of the value121. The relevant dates are June 23, 2004; September 22, 2005; and October
23, 2006.
122. For example, in a copy of the 2004 rankings press release on file with the
author, the release indicates that it is embargoed until June 23, 2004. This
suggests that some members of the media may have had prior access to the
data, and that some of the information may have leaked out ahead of the official
stories. See Press Release, AccountAbility, New Global Rating Challenges Top
100 Companies’ Accountability (June 23, 2004) (on file with author).
123. If the information was not available early enough in the day, it may not
have been possible for investors to respond through trading on the event day.
124. See Using Daily Stock Returns, supra note 107, at 15.
125. See, e.g., Gupta & Goldar, supra note 79, at 88 (using a ten-day window
as their preferred choice).
126. Werner Antweiler & Murray Z. Frank, Do U.S. Stock Markets Typically
Overreact to Corporate News Stories 3 (Aug. 2006) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with authors).
127. The “one” day window for the [-1,0] window is, of course, two days. I will
generally refer to these windows collectively as the “immediate” event windows.
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weighted NYSE/NASDAQ composite return available in the
CRSP database. However, estimation using the alternatives of
the equal-weighted composite and the Standard & Poor 500
returns produced generally similar results. 128
6.2 Results
The first empirical questions of interest are whether the
Fortune corporate social responsibility rankings were seen by the
market as providing significant independent information, and
whether markets viewed the corporate social responsibility
investments of firms favorably. In order to address these issues, I
first look to the cumulative abnormal returns, averaged over the
full sample of ranked firms. The results from estimation of the
CAAR for each year/event window combination are presented in
Table 2.
The results from Table 2 provide only weak support for
claims that Fortune’s third party corporate social responsibility
rankings are perceived by the market as conveying new
information relevant to the value of firms. The strongest support
for the independent significance of the Fortune/AccountAbility
rankings is found in the immediate and the five-day windows for
2004. The immediate reaction to the release of the rankings is a
weakly significant negative response. If the day prior to the
release date is included, the rankings can be associated with a
statistically significant drop of 0.47% on average in the share
prices of the sample firms. 129 However, there is no significant
immediate response if we focus only on measuring the impact
from the actual release date of the rankings.

128. I discuss the results with the alternate measures when the results vary.
The market returns were adjusted for dividends to correspond to the adjusted
share prices used for the event study firms.
129. This is supported by the similar result obtained using the S&P 500 as an
alternate market measure: [-1,0] window CAAR = -0.0047* (Z-stat = 1.64). Note
that the alternative of the equal weighted NYSE did not produce significant
results.
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Table 2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for
CSR Rankings
Year
[0]
[0,2]
[0,4]
2006
-0.0026
-0.0029
0.0007
(-1.41)
(-0.90)
(0.17)
2005

-0.0022
(-1.41)

-0.0013
(-0.48)

0.0012
(0.33)

2004

-0.0008
(-0.46)

0.0040
(1.23)

0.0088**
(2.14)

Year
2006

[-1,0]
0.0020
(0.77)

[-1,1]
0.0022
(0.67)

[-1,3]
0.0022
(0.53)

2005

0.0034
(1.55)

-0.0006
(-0.22)

0.0019
(0.56)

2004

-0.0047*
(-1.81)

0.0003
(0.11)

0.0057
(1.39)

Note: The Z-statistics for the null of no significant CAAR for each
year-event window are included in parenthesis. Significant Zstatistics are identified as follows: ∗ = significant at 10%; ∗∗ =
significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ = significant at 1% or higher level of
significance for a two tailed test.

The significant positive five-day CAAR for 2004 provides
some evidence that the market perceived the rankings as “good”
news, enhancing the profitability of the ranked firms. Additional
support for this interpretation can be found in the consistent
results obtained using the S&P 500 as the alternate market
measure. These alternate estimates produce significant positive
CAAR in 2004 in the five-day window whether beginning on the
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event day or one day prior, as well as in the three-day window
from the event date. 130 The use of the longer window might be
justified if stock returns tend to initially “over-react” to news and
drift toward equilibrium over a longer period than the typical
event window of one or two days. 131 The magnitude of the
significant effects associated with the rankings in 2004 is not
large, but does compare favorably with estimates from some other
studies of information as regulation. For example, Hamilton
identified statistically significant negative effects from the first
release of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data in the order of
0.28% to 0.37%. 132
Set against this optimistic interpretation of the results, one
must consider the more general pattern of inconsistent and
insignificant results for the other years. There are no significant
abnormal returns generated by the release of the rankings in
2006, although this general conclusion is not always robust across
alternate market measures. 133 In addition, the signs of the
estimated abnormal returns in 2006 are not consistent across the
alternative specifications of the event window. The shorter
130. The 2004 significant estimates for the S&P alternate market measure are
as follows: [0,2] window CAAR = 0.0091***(Z-stat=2.82); [0,4] window CAAR =
0.0126***(Z-stat=3.02); [-1,3] window CAAR = 0.0095**(Z-stat=2.28). Note that
the alternative of the equal weighted NYSE did not produce significant results.
131. See Antweiler & Frank, supra note 126, at 3.
132. Hamilton, supra note 75, at 108-109. These figures are for Hamilton’s
estimates of cumulative average abnormal returns for a one-day window. He
found larger, significant negative effects over a five-day window, ranging from 0.93% to -1.2%. See id. at 108. See also Madhu Khanna, Wilma Rose H. Quimio
& Dora Bojilova, Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental
Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 252 (1998) (finding statistically
significant effects ranging from -0.31% to -0.71% over a two-day window and
from -0.56% to -0.57% over a five-day window for chemical industry firms
covered by the TRI over the period from 1990 to 1994). See also Konar & Cohen,
supra note 76 at 115-116 (finding that firms mentioned in the media in relation
to the first release of the TRI data experienced significant negative returns of 0.29% (one-day) to -0.74% (five-day)).
133. A significant negative CAAR is generated for 2006 for the [0] window
using the S&P 500 market measure (CAAR = -0.0038**(Z-stat=2.02)). Looking
to the event windows beginning one day prior to the release of the rankings, the
significant results produce positive abnormal returns when the equal weighted
NYSE index is used as the market measure: [-1,0] window CAAR = 0.0084***(Zstat = 3.14); [-1,1] window CAAR = 0.0090***(Z-stat = 2.73); [-1,3] window CAAR
= 0.0089**(Z-stat = 2.09).
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windows beginning from the release date of the rankings indicate
a negative market response. In contrast, those beginning one-day
prior yield positive abnormal return estimates. A similar pattern
is evident in the 2005 results. The signs on the CAAR for the
immediate windows are inconsistent and the estimates
insignificant. 134 While the signs on the estimates are consistent
for the other event windows, the results are not significant and
the absolute size of the CAAR is very small, with a maximum
impact of 0.19% over a five-day window. 135 Given the general
insignificance of the results and lack of robustness across event
windows and market measures, the results provide little support
for the idea that the market regarded the rankings as important
information relevant to the value of the firms in the sample.
A number of factors may contribute to the lack of significant
reaction in the markets. The 2006 sample is relatively small, at
only 37 firms. This may have contributed to a loss of power and
made it difficult to reliably detect the small impact of the
rankings on the stock return estimates. 136 There is a fairly high
proportion of European firms in the sample. More stringent
European regulatory requirements for reporting corporate social
responsibility activity may have helped diminish the impact of
the information conveyed by the relative rankings of the firms in
the Fortune rankings. 137 A more general possibility is that there
134. The insignificance of the results is not always consistent for the
immediate windows. For the [0] window, a significant negative CAAR is
generated for 2005 when using the S&P 500 as the market measure (CAAR =
-0.0039** (Z-stat = 2.54)), whereas for the [-1,0] window a significant positive
CAAR is generated when using the equal weighted NYSE measure (CAAR =
-0.0073*** (Z-stat = 3.27)). In both these cases, the other two alternate market
measures do not generate significant results.
135. A slightly larger maximum impact is obtained when using the equal
weighted return as the market measure (0.4% maximum effect over five days),
but the estimate remains statistically indistinguishable from the alternative of
no impact attributable to the rankings. The magnitude of the estimated CAAR
using the alternative of the S&P 500 essentially mirrors the value weighted
market measure estimates of Table 2.
136. Recall that in 2006 there are only 37 firms in the sample, compared with
52 for 2005 and 52 firms in 2004. See supra Table 1.
137. For a concise summary of relevant corporate law related to corporate
social responsibility reporting, see KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 31. The relative
share of European firms is 41% in 2006 compared with 38% in 2005 and 40% in
2004. See supra Table 1.
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is not enough change in the rankings from one year to another for
subsequent annual releases to provide significant new
information to markets. This explanation is consistent with
finding the strongest results associated with 2004 (the initial
release of the rankings by AccountAbility). While corporate social
responsibility performance may be important to firms and
investors on an ongoing basis, the event study methodology may
fail to disclose this effect in relation to annual corporate social
responsibility rankings.
Another possibility is that the results for the CAARs of all
ranked firms do not really provide a satisfactory way of
addressing the question of whether corporate social responsibility
investment is viewed as enhancing firm value. The range of
performances across firms in Fortune’s rankings may prevent a
clear analysis by averaging CAARs over all the firms. If markets
perceive corporate social responsibility as enhancing firm value,
one might expect that higher-ranking firms would be rewarded
with positive CAARs, while laggards would be punished with
smaller CAARs or even negative CAARs. In order to investigate
this hypothesis and tease out the implications of the Fortune
rankings for the role of market discipline in enforcing corporate
social responsibility commitments, I conducted a split-sample
estimation for “leaders” and “laggards.” As one reduces the size
of the sample, the power of estimates is reduced. Consequently,
there is an uncertain balance to be struck between identifying
these sub-groups narrowly and still including enough firms for
robust estimation.
As an admittedly somewhat arbitrary
compromise, I have classified the top third of sample firms as
“leaders” and the bottom third of firms as ‘‘laggards.” Results for
the various event windows and years are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for
CSR Leaders and Laggards
Year Relative Rank
[0]
[0,2]
[0,4]
2006
Top Third
-0.0005
-0.0012
-0.0020
(-0.15)
(-0.21)
(-0.27)

2005

2004

Year
2006

2005

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/2

Bottom Third

-0.0019
(-0.56)

0.0036
(0.60)

0.0091
(1.19)

Top Third

-0.0034
(-1.41)

-0.0022
(-0.49)

0.0017
(0.28)

Bottom Third

-0.0007
(-0.23)

0.0021
(0.40)

0.0044
(0.66)

Top Third

-0.0044
(-1.47)

-0.0034
(-0.65)

-0.0024
(-0.36)

Bottom Third

0.0006
(0.17)

0.0029
(0.50)

0.0003
(0.05)

Relative Rank
Top Third

[-1,0]
0.0088*
(1.90)

[-1,1]
0.0062
(1.1)

[-1,3]
0.0070
(0.96)

Bottom Third

0.0003
(0.06)

0.0037
(0.62)

0.0079
(1.03)

Top Third

0.0034
(0.90)

-0.0008
(-0.17)

0.0020
(0.34)

Bottom Third

.0026
(0.86)

.0027
(0.52)

.0038
(0.56)
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Top Third

[-1,0]
-0.0102**
(-2.39)

[-1,1]
-0.0080
(-1.52)

[-1,3]
-0.0048
(-0.71)

Bottom Third

-0.0022
(-0.46)

0.0019
(0.32)

-0.0016
(-0.21)

189

Note: The Z-statistics for the null of no significant CAAR for each
year-event window are included in parenthesis. Significant Zstatistics are identified as follows: ∗ = significant at 10%; ∗∗
=significant at 5%; ∗∗∗ =significant at 1% or higher level of
significance for a two-tailed test.

The results do not provide strong empirical support for the
idea that sustainability rankings can operate as a form of market
regulation that might encourage firms to undertake corporate
social responsibility commitments and help enforce them. Again,
the predominant pattern is the absence of statistically significant
results for either leaders or laggards in response to their
rankings. There are some exceptions. For example, in 2006,
there is a positive significant response to the ranking of the
“leader” firms, if the immediate window includes the day prior to
release of the rankings, but not otherwise. 138 The absolute size of
this effect is fairly large, reflecting an unanticipated increase in
average share value of 0.88%. The level of corporate social
responsibility performance in 2006 was higher than in any
previous year for the leaders, so such a response would tend to
reinforce incentives for companies to invest in the corporate social
responsibility commitments reflected in the rankings. Some
additional support for this theory might be garnered by looking to
results for 2005, using the equal weighted NYSE as the market
measure. In 2005, using this alternate market measure, and
looking at the event window including a day prior to the rankings
announcement,
corporate
social
responsibility
“leaders”
experience statistically and economically significant positive
138. A similar result is obtained when using the equal weighted NYSE as the
alternate market measure: [-1,0] window Top 1/3 CAAR = 0.0144*** (Z-stat =
3.09).
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abnormal returns. The increase in share value peaks at 1.28% for
the five-day window. 139
However, looking at the results more broadly, the evidentiary
support for such an interpretation is fragile. If we focus on the
abnormal returns for 2006, beginning from the ranking release
date, the sign of the estimated response is negative for leader
firms and the results are insignificant. Similarly, in 2005, if we
look at responses from the release date, the sign of returns is
again negative and any deviations in returns cannot confidently
be attributed to the impact of the rankings. 140 In addition, the
sign on the estimated abnormal returns for the “laggards” is often
positive and similar in magnitude to effects estimated for the
“leaders”, although the “laggard’s” results are also not generally
significant for 2005 or 2006. 141
Results for 2004 also fail to provide strong evidence
supporting either the viability of corporate social responsibility
investments, or a quasi-regulatory impact for the Fortune
rankings. The results for leaders in 2004 achieve the highest
degree of statistical significance and are relatively large. The
initial reaction, including one day prior to the rankings, was a
drop of 1.02% in the average share value of leader firms. The
existence of a negative response for leader firms in 2004, and its
statistical significance is one of the few relatively robust
results. 142 To the extent that the market responded, it indicated

139. The results for leaders in 2005 for these windows using the equal
weighted NYSE market measure are as follows: [-1,0] CAAR = 0.0072* (Z-stat =
1.91); [-1,1] CAAR = 0.0122** (Z-stat = 2.14); [-1,3] CAAR = 0.0128* (Z-stat =
1.73).
140. One significant result is generated when the S&P 500 is used as the
market measure. This market measure generates a significant abnormal return
from the rankings on their release date, but the sign is negative, not positive: [0]
window CAAR for S&P = -0.0048* (Z-stat = 1.80).
141. There is a significant positive return for the “laggard” firms generated
when the equal weighted NYSE measure is used for the market return, and the
window includes a day prior to rankings release: [-1,4] window CAAR = .0134*
(Z-stat = 1.74). This significant positive return exceeds the comparable estimate
for the corporate social responsibility “leaders”.
142. A significant negative response is generated when using the equal
weighted NYSE market return for: the [0,2] window (CAAR = -0.0115**(Zstat=2.15)); the [-1,0] window (CAAR = -0.0071*(Z-stat= 1.63);
[-1,4] window
(CAAR = -0.0114*(Z-stat = 1.65). A significant negative response is generated
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that the relatively larger investments of leaders in corporate
social responsibility did not enhance their market value. A
potential explanation for the 2004 results may rest with the fact
that the average score of the leaders was lower in 2004 than in
subsequent years. 143 Perhaps even the top third of firms in 2004
were viewed by the market as coming up short in their corporate
social responsibility commitments.
The difficulty with this story is revealed by the performance
of laggards. While corporate social responsibility laggards did
experience some negative CAARs in relation to the release of the
2004 rankings, these results were not large, not consistent, and
statistically insignificant. This is in sharp contrast to the
consistently negative, larger, and often significant losses the
corporate social responsibility rankings in 2004 produced for the
leaders.
At the very least, the indifference of the market to the very
negative rankings of the laggards suggests that there is no
uniform market incentive for firms to engage in the type of public
law-oriented corporate social responsibility reflected in the
Fortune rankings. The risks and rewards are specific to the firms
and industries involved. Walmart, as a laggard in the 2004-2006
sample, may not be “disciplined” by the market if improvements
in its ranking would require it to abandon its business model
based on highly competitive labor conditions, and instead involve
labor as a stakeholder and promote collective bargaining. 144
when using the S&P 500 measure for the [-1,0] window (CAAR = -0.0099** (Zstat = 2.28)).
143. Recall that the average leader’s score in 2004 was only 39 out of a
possible 100 points, compared with average leader scores of 48 and 52 in 2005
and 2006, respectively. See supra Table 1.
144. In fact, Walmart has moved from its “laggard” position at the bottom of
the ranking in more recent surveys. It now ranks 64th in 2008 with a score of
44 on the AccountAbility scale, in contrast with its initial 2004 ranking at 86th
with a score of 6. See Full G100 Ranking, Accountability Rating 2008,
ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.accountabilityrating.com/ latest_overview.asp (last
visited Sept. 16, 2010).
The company has invested particularly in
environmental sustainability initiatives over this period, and has announced its
own sustainability index initiative. See also Press Release, Walmart, Walmart
Announces Sustainable Product Index (July 16, 2009), available at
http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/9277.aspx.
The Walmart example
illustrates that corporate social responsibility can influence the business
decisions of large firms, even if third party rankings are not effective
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Alternatively, perennial corporate social responsibility leaders,
such as BP, may be viewed as engaging in necessary strategic
positioning; poor CSR commitments by these firms may leave
economically important opportunities to influence their business
environment unrealized. 145 The lack of a consistent positive
market response to corporate social responsibility investments
undermines
claims that
broad-based corporate
social
responsibility rankings such as Fortune’s can operate as an
enforcement mechanism tending to promote the widespread
adoption of corporate social responsibility policies implementing
public law norms. Assessing the split sample results as a whole,
there is little evidence that the market responds favorably to the
more intensive corporate social responsibility investments of
Fortune’s leaders and the poor performance of laggards appears
to go unpunished.
While the evidence supporting a “regulatory” role for
corporate social responsibility rankings appears weak, this may
partly be a function of the empirical methodology. It may be that
the focus on the top third and bottom third of firms does not
match the way that the market views the corporate social
responsibility performance of the firms. The approach may be too
arbitrary;
simply
using
aggregate
CAARs
across
“leader”/’’laggard” groupings might be insufficient to precisely
identify the independent impact of the relative rankings. In
addition, the simple aggregate CAARs do not allow us to control
for some factors that may be relevant to the impact of the
rankings. For example, many of the top performers are European
firms. Assessing the market response to the rankings may
require controlling for the home jurisdiction of the companies,
both because there may be a “home bias” in investor responses
and because European corporate law imposes more stringent
reporting requirements for corporate social responsibility
disciplinary devices. The type of corporate social responsibility engaged in
would then be what the company deems in its long run interests. By
constructing its own index, Walmart obtains some room to tailor the vision of
sustainability to reflect its own business interests and strengths, rather than
having to adjust in response to externally imposed norms.
145. This would be one way to interpret the significant negative response in
2004 for the leader firms; investors and consumers may have felt that the level
of commitment was too weak, despite the firms being relative leaders.
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activity. 146 These stricter requirements may mean that the
Fortune rankings, which draw on published data, provide less in
the way of comparative information about the quality of
European firms’ corporate social responsibility activity. Another
possibility is that there are sector-specific influences that are
important to understanding the results for the cut sample. The
small size of the leader/laggard samples also means that single
firms may dominate the analysis more easily. While a number of
other event studies have used stratification of the sample as a
way to unpack the market response to the quality of performance,
an alternative approach will provide a further check on the
robustness of conclusions from the analysis above. 147
In order to obtain a finer assessment of the market response
to relative performance of the ranked firms, as well as the market
response to a firm’s own changes in its corporate social
responsibility rank, I ran a pooled cross-sectional analysis of the
individual CARs for each firm over the 2005 and 2006 years
covering the Fortune rankings. 148 The estimating equation takes
the following general form:

ARit = α + βXit + eit
where α is a constant and X it is a vector of firm-specific
characteristics at time t. In the specifications, I included a time
trend, as well as dummies for the industrial classification of the
firm, the home jurisdiction of the firm, the percentile corporate
social responsibility rank of the firm and the change in the firm’s
percentile rank from the previous ranking. I estimated the cross146. See KPMG 2005, supra note 2, at 40.
147. See, e.g., Gupta & Goldar, supra note 79 at 88-92 (constructing CAARs for
subsamples of their firms based on the number of “leaves” received in the
environmental ranking).
148. The time dimension was restricted this way in order to use the 2004
rankings to provide data on the dynamic performance of the firms. Note that
because the sample of firms changed somewhat with each ranking, some firms
did not have rankings in 2004 or 2005 to provide the basis for measuring the
change in rank. These firms were dropped from the pooled estimation. The
pooled sample consisted of results for 78 firms. The choice to restrict the sample
period to 2005-2006 also restricts the estimation to direct rankings published
through Fortune.
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sectional regression over the CARs generated from the set of
event windows previously considered. The results for the
coefficient estimates on rank and change in rank are reported in
Table 4. 149
Table 4: Cross Sectional Results: CSR Rank and
Changes in Relative Rank
Variable
[0]
[0,2]
[0,4]
Rank
0.0076*
-0.0036
-0.0094
(0.084)
(0.706)
(0.394)
Delta Rank
Variable
Rank
Delta Rank

0.0036
(0.535)

0.0142
(0.271)

0.0077
(0.601)

[-1,0]
0.0150**
(0.041)

[-1,1]
0.0095
(0.203)

[-1,3]
0.0016
(0.888)

-0.0067
(0.486)

-0.0066
(0.696)

-0.0044
(0.774)

Note: The p-values for the coefficient estimates are given in
brackets. Significant coefficient estimates are identified as
follows: ∗ =significant at 10%; ∗∗ =significant at 5%; ∗∗∗
=significant at 1% or higher level of significance for a one tailed
test.

The results from the pooled cross-sectional analysis offer
some additional support for claims that corporate social
149. I have used rank as the appropriate measure in this analysis, on the
assumption that this is a more precise measure of the firms’ corporate social
responsibility performance than the individual corporate social responsibility
scores. However, estimation using the corporate social responsibility scores did
not generate substantially different results, although significance of the
estimates was reduced. Regressions with additional dummies to identify
“outliers” with extremely positive or negative relative changes in their rankings
also were not generally significant. The results in Table 4 are based on using
the CAR for each firm generated with the value weighted NYSE market return.
The results for the alternative market measures are generally similar. Again, I
discuss these alternative results when they vary.
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responsibility is profitable and that market responses generated
by third party rankings may provide incentives for firms to
adhere to their commitments. The coefficient on percentile rank
is positive and significant for the immediate event windows. 150
These results support a fairly immediate positive relationship
between corporate social responsibility performance and
abnormal returns. This positive relationship indicates that once
we look to the finer cross-sectional data, adding basic controls,
markets view more significant investments in corporate social
responsibility as enhancing the value of the company, while below
average performance is associated with lower returns. The crosssection results thus offer some assurance that corporate social
responsibility rankings such as those produced by Fortune can
produce market effects that will provide incentives to reward
good performers and discipline poorly ranked companies. The
results support a limited optimism that third party rankings such
as Fortune’s can operate as one means of promoting effective
corporate social responsibility commitments and reinforcing the
embedded norms in a transnational setting.
Even this optimism must be tempered, however, since the
results for the change in relative rank appear to indicate that
there is little dynamic disciplinary effect.
The coefficient
estimates are positive, but insignificant, for the three-day and
five-day windows beginning on the event day itself. In contrast,
insignificant, negative coefficients for changes in own-rank are
observed for the pre-announcement event windows. 151 These
150. The coefficients on the rank coefficient are similar in magnitude and
significance when the alternative market measures of the equal weighted NYSE
and S&P 500 are used. The coefficient for the [0] window is marginally
insignificant when the equal weighted return is used (p<0.139). All other
estimates for the immediate window remain significant, at a slightly lower level
than the coefficients in Table 4 for the equal weighted market return and a
slightly higher level for the S&P 500 alternate market measure.
The
coefficients on the change in rank variable in the immediate windows are
similarly signed and insignificant for the alternative market measures. The
estimates on rank and change in rank for all other windows also remain
insignificant across the alternate market measures.
151. Alternative specifications using dummies for firms experiencing large
positive and negative changes in relative rank produced qualitatively similar
results. Even for firms experiencing strong relative gains or losses in corporate
social responsibility positioning, there was no corresponding response in the
abnormal stock return.
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results fail to provide any statistically reliable evidence that the
market responds to a company’s change in relative performance
over time. Based on the sample data, there does not appear to be
any conclusive evidence that markets will “discipline” firms that
fall behind in their relative corporate social responsibility
performance over time, nor do markets appear to reward CSR
“improvers.” The lack of market discipline along this dynamic
dimension may indicate more limited potential for market
pressures associated with corporate social responsibility to
impose truly robust enforcement of firms’ commitments.
7

CONCLUSIONS

Corporate Social Responsibility is a trend that shows signs of
becoming increasingly integrated into the business of
transnational corporations. The overlap between the corporate
social responsibility activity of these firms and the goals and
norms of public law raise questions about how effective it can be
as a transmission mechanism for global public law norms. The
absence of a global public regulatory authority to enforce the
public law commitments at the heart of the current corporate
social responsibility movement makes the issue of its
effectiveness as self-regulation more salient.
One means by which corporate social responsibility
commitments may theoretically be made effective is through the
largely private activity of third parties who engage in
comparative ranking and publication of the corporate social
responsibility performance of transnational firms. The rankings
published by Fortune are an example of this private standardsetting and bench-marking activity.
While the theoretical
possibility is readily established, the question that remains open
is whether such standards generate meaningful impacts in
practice. The objective of this paper is to begin to provide
empirical evidence bearing on the practical potential of rankings
such as Fortune’s to contribute to meaningful corporate social
responsibility commitments by transnational firms.
The results of the study are somewhat equivocal. The results
offer partial support for claims that rankings such as Fortune’s
are treated as independent events revealing information
significant to the value of firms. The results also offer qualified
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support for the proposition that corporate social responsibility
activity is viewed by markets as enhancing the value of
transnational firms, and that there is a positive relationship
between relative rank and abnormal returns that would tend to
reward good CSR performers and punish low-ranking firms.
There is thus some indication that market response will provide
incentives that will encourage firms to adhere to corporate social
responsibility commitments, so that independent rankings such
as Fortune’s can act as an alternative to traditional enforcement.
There is some potential for third party rankings to “regulate”
through provision of information, and some indication that
market discipline will “enforce” corporate social responsibility
commitments. However, the results are not robust across event
windows, years or model specifications addressing the relative
ranking effect. This leaves residual doubt about whether the
Fortune rankings in particular, and perhaps corporate social
responsibility rankings more generally, will have the positive
effects that could constitute corporate social responsibility as
global public law norms.
One potential gap in the present study is the inability to
break down the cross-sectional results by conditioning on the type
of corporate social responsibility activity undertaken by the firm.
It may be that the market only views some forms of this activity
as profitable. This information, while not reflected in the
rankings themselves, would be readily available to investors
through the same published reports that are used to calculate
Fortune’s rankings.
Constructing measures of the specific
corporate social responsibility focus of firms may offer a way to
assess whether relative rank operates only in conjunction with
the type of activity to influence the market response of investors.
As noted in the discussion of Fortune’s rankings, each screen
for corporate social responsibility involves a particular vision of
corporate social responsibility by those constructing the ranking
tool. Rejection of robust results for one screen does not imply that
all such screens will be ineffective in the role of quasi-public
enforcement devices. Comparative work that examined the crosssectional returns of firms conditioned on features of their
corporate social responsibility activity and performance under
alternative corporate social responsibility screens might help
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establish the parameters of most critical importance to markets.
In addition, the case study here is limited to a relatively early
period in the rankings and it does not include responses to
rankings from very recent years. It is possible that, as with
South African divestment, interest in corporate social
responsibility performance and rankings has varied over time. 152
Legal academics have begun to turn their attention to the
potential for large multinational corporations to play a role in
establishing and implementing norms transnationally. 153 This
process is increasingly viewed as one complementary to the
traditional mechanisms of public law in the international
realm. 154 This new approach is reflected in the emergence of
fused private-public initiatives such as the Global Compact and
GRI. In order to take full advantage of the potential synergy,
public law actors in the international realm will need to give
attention to the priorities of markets to help harness their power
to enforce the public law commitments made through
transnational corporate social responsibility activity. While the
empirical results of this paper provide some support for the
theory that markets can incentivize and help enforce corporate
social responsibility commitments through third party rankings
and disclosures, the results are not particularly robust. Further
empirical work examining the impact of alternative ranking
schemes could help to answer the question of whether this
relatively weak role for third party “informational regulation” is
more general or just reflects disinterest in Fortune’s rankings,
perhaps because the relevant audience has already come to
similar conclusions about the ranked firms. 155
152. The increased scores of the G100 in more recent versions of the
AccountAbillity/Fortune rankings may reflect an increased belief that corporate
social responsibility performance is of increasing concern to consumers and
investors. However, changes in the ranking methodology make it difficult to be
sure that the increased scores are really reflective of an improved level of
performance.
153. See generally Backer, supra note 1; Affolder, supra note 1.
154. This is the premise behind the adoption of the UN Global Compact.
155. This would suggest that much of the influence of corporate responsibility
is felt on the investor side, particularly through the channel of professional or
institutional investors accessing firm information directly and making
systematic comparisons on their own. The relative impact of using popular
media would be greater for individual investors and consumers, particularly if

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol28/iss1/2
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A further cautionary note emerges from this case study.
Amongst the “leader” firms in 2004-2006, we find companies that
have been at the center of recent crises. Firms that were revealed
as particularly vulnerable in the financial crisis, including
Citigroup, HSBC and General Motors formed part of the “leader”
group in 2006. Perhaps the most ironic aspect of the rankings is
the standout performance of BP, ranked second in 2006, first in
2005 and first in 2004. A major aspect of the company’s
sustainability platform was anchored in its claims of
environmental responsibility. In light of the recent Gulf Coast
spill, it is clear that reputational interest and market pressure
alone will not always produce sustainable practice.
More
generally, it is not clear that markets will strike the same balance
between goals of sustainability and profitability that public
regulatory authorities would choose in the public interest.
The results of the present study provide some qualified
support for the idea that privately provided corporate social
responsibility rankings can have a “regulatory” character. To the
extent that these private sector standard-setting and benchmarking activities are effective, questions loom regarding their
ability to reflect choices congruent with the public values
underlying
the
private
commitments.
Market-based
informational regulation is likely to prove an incomplete
substitute for traditional regulatory authority. However, in the
transnational context, it may have a potential role as a
complementary channel for the diffusion of public law norms.
The results from this study of Fortune’s sustainability rankings
provide some support for this role, but suggest caution about both
its potential strength and scope.

there is greater diffusion of results from popular media like Fortune through
other media channels, such as individual or NGO newsgroups, web-sites, blogs,
etc. to individuals who would not otherwise research corporate behavior directly
and systematically. The lack of a robust, significant impact for the Fortune
rankings suggests that this latter influence is not particularly strong.
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